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International Migration,
Development, and Policy:
Reconsidering Migration Transition
Theory—A Way Forward
Migration transition theories have been contested as they informed immigration
policy in the Global North, which—based on assumptions that immigrants from
developing countries may be a threat to social stability and economic opportunity—
aimed to diminish emigration from the South. Development policies were proposed
that could produce a “migration transition” in the South, where it was assumed
that improved economic development would act as a substitute for migration and
lead to minimal emigration, thus reducing overall immigration to the Global North.
However, policies did not result in a migration transition. Acknowledging
problematic rhetoric and contradictory policy and outcomes, this paper addresses
key deficiencies of migration transition models. By reconsidering how migration
transition frameworks could be modified to inform immigration policy, we may
pursue theoretical and methodological paths for future empirical inquiries on
development and international migration.

Karin A. C. Johnson
University of California, Riverside

Introduction
In recent years, policymakers in affluent countries in the Global North have moved
to make immigration policies and vetting procedures more restrictive. They have
alluded that migrants and refugees from the South could threaten the disintegration
of social stability (Bonvin 1996; France24 2015). Preoccupation with national
security by developed nations’ politicians and the civil sphere and their concerns
about incoming migrants from developing countries is not novel (Castles, De Haas,
& Miller 2014). Some current immigration policy in the Global North bears
vestiges of updates from the 1990s. These revisions were put into place following
a debate beginning in the 1960s and 1970s that evaluated how development could
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reduce immigration from the South. Economists monopolized the debate and
introduced resolutions to curb migration via development policies based on
economic equilibrium models. It was projected that increased development would
lead to a short-term 'migration hump' in developed countries and a 'migration
transition' in developing countries (Martin & Taylor 1996). Given this historically
problematic approach to policy, migration transition theory should not be wholly
abandoned but be revisited. I argue that migration transition frameworks can inform
appropriate long-term policies. Strategies that reflect international migration and
development trends must apply to the interest and safety of nations, international
organizations, and individual migrants.
Migration transition theories emerged in the 1960s and 70s as part of a
debate about development and the consequences of globalization and whether
migration caused development or whether development induced migration. Frank
(1969, 1979) and Papademetriou (1985) contended that emigration from the Global
South led to further underdevelopment in those areas. Others concluded that
international migration would spur modernization and productivity, benefiting both
sending and receiving countries (Alder 1981; Pennix 1982). What remained from
the debate at the end of the 20th century was that some policy in the North was
informed by the false perception that immigrants from the South were poor,
uneducated, unskilled youth from “backward rural areas” who came to capital-rich
countries to improve their relative wellbeing by occupying low-income jobs, and
absorption of these immigrants into the labor force would lead to increased levels
of national unemployment (Piore 1979, 3; Bonvin 1996, 7; Collier 2013, 84). As a
result, the view that immigration from less developed countries should diminish to
protect national social and economic wellbeing in the North was legitimated.
Economic equilibrium models predicted that developing the Global South
would act as a direct substitute for migration (Taylor 1996, 11). In the 1990s,
supranational organizations implemented neoliberal development policies,
including restructuring plans, international trade, foreign aid, foreign direct
investment (FDI), and debt relief, to ameliorate conditions in developing nations.
One such policy that depicts this period is NAFTA (the 1994 North American Free
Trade Agreement), which aimed to increase trade exchange among the US, Canada,
and Mexico and assumed job creation would reduce immigration. Yet cross-border
mobility increased. As the NAFTA example suggests, despite the implementation
of economic development policies and the adoption of selectively restrictive
immigration policies by the North, migration between developing to developed
countries continues. Recent research shows international migration and
development are complementary, not causal. While migration can affect real
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structural political and economic change in sending and receiving societies, the
effects are limited (De Haas 2009).

Migration Transition Theories
Problematic immigration policy objectives based on economic equilibrium models
that were proposed as ‘a solution to resolving the problem’ of immigration from
the South prompted me to reassess migration transition theory. Migration transition
theory posits that through development countries experience a transition over time
from predominantly migrant-sending to migrant-receiving, and emigration
eventually falls close to zero. There are two primary approaches to migration
theory, demographic and economic, which, respectively, explain migrational
changes as related to national population and fiscal increases.
Demographic migration transition theory is illustrated through Zelinsky’s
(1971) hypothesis that population change occurs through vital and mobility
transitions over space and time. Zelinsky applied principles of spatial diffusion to
the classic demographic population equation, population change = natural increase
+ net migration, where net population change is the sum of natural increase (births
less deaths) and net migration (immigration less emigration). Zelinsky devised five
stages of curvilinear spatiotemporal mobility transitions. These are concisely
summarized by Appleyard’s (1992) four-stage transition model (Figure 1.1 below).
Zelinsky concluded that mobility transitions were linked to progressive, irreversible
demographic social changes brought about through modernization. Notably,
Zelinsky (1971, 48) raised a crucial question regarding demographic and migration
transitions concerning the population carry capacity theorem and development,
asking: “When and how will mobility saturation be reached?”
The second type of migration transition model is based on the concept of
economic equilibrium, which is the foundation of neoclassical economic migration
theories (Sjaasad 1962; Todaro 1969). In contrast to curvilinear demographic
models, it assumes a linear relationship where economic revenue is inversely
proportional to migration rates, which are expected to reach equilibrium. At the
threshold point, economic conditions (e.g., relative cross-national wage
differentials) would become equal, resulting in zero net migration. Martin and
Taylor (1996) employed this type of theory in their model of a ‘migration hump’
(Figure 1.2), which was used to inform development policies meant to diminish
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Figure 1. Migration Transition Models
1.1. Demographic Transition Model (Appleyard 1992)

1.2. Economic Transition Model (Martin and Taylor 1996)

1.3. Migration-Development Transition Model (De Haas 2010)
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unwanted immigration to the Global North. Their model was based on the
assumption that with the increased economic development of the Global South
through international trade, gross national income (GNI) levels would gradually
rise. This would lead to a short-term migration bump (due to more people being
able to migrate from the South to the North as a result of their increased wages),
followed by a decline in migration to zero when national incomes were relatively
equivalent (a 'migration trough'). Martin and Taylor acknowledged that if trade
and migration were substitutes, a migration trough would result. In contrast, if
they were complements, a migration hump would stabilize as a ‘migration
plateau.’
Skeldon (1997) critiqued Zelinsky's theory. He found it described a
unilinear, deterministic, and universal system based on a generalized historical
sequence of industrialization, demographic changes, and migration trends in
present-day developed countries (mostly Western Europe). Skeldon pointed out
that processes of social and economic development and concomitant mobility
change, as experienced in Europe, may not equally apply to contemporary
developing countries. There is no unique pattern of mobility change. More recently,
De Haas (2010) reviewed demographic and economic migration transition models.
Like Skeldon, he concluded that despite weaknesses and omissions in classic
models that by amending hypotheses to fit available data, transition theories could
yield valuable insights into structured regularities in international migration
patterns. These frameworks incorporate social structure and agency, as well as
account for stagnation in and reversibility of immigration flows. Thus, they explain
how development processes are systematically, causally linked to mobility.
De Haas (2010) hypothesized that human and economic development
generally leads to higher levels of migration through increasing personal
capabilities, aspirations, and occupational specialization, where international
development is associated with a nonlinear sequence of migration transitions. In
the modified version of migration-development transition theory (Figure 1.3), the
model assumes that as development increases, migrants will pursue better
opportunities, such that out-migration would grow more quickly than in-migration.
Emigration would overtake immigration (a 'migration hump'). A hump is produced
when emigration hits a critical threshold at some degree of development, followed
by a gradual drop. Immigration would continue to steadily grow, leading to
emigration and immigration attaining a point of equilibrium at high levels of
development. Once developmental progress has advanced past equilibrium,
migration patterns would reach a period of higher in-migration, where outmigration would taper off in an inverse-U shape.
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As a whole, demographic-mobility transition models are based on a theory
that population increases resulting from modernization processes drive movement,
and economic transition models are based on a theory that the less fortunate move
toward locales of higher wages. While these frameworks are quite different
theoretically, they are superficially analogous. All approaches use measures of
development (e.g., societal modernization, economic development, or trade) as the
variable explaining changes to migration. A visual comparison of Figure 1.1 Stage
3 and Figures 1.2 and 1.3 suggests that development should lead to migration
transition(s), which end with high immigration and little to no emigration.

Limitations of Migration Transition Theories
Although transition models by Zelinsky and Martin and Taylor are theoretically
sound, they have flaws to the extent that they are inapplicable to long-term
international migration trends. De Haas’ model is more relevant since it
incorporates amendments from these models and employs substantive migrational
data, acting as a sliding ruler describing potential migration-development
combinations, but it lacks theoretical predictive and explanatory power due to data
limitations outside the researcher’s control. The transition models have three main
shortcomings: (1) they misrepresent global mobility equality; (2) they inaccurately
account for the role that the state plays in shaping international migration patterns;
and (3) there is little evidence that international migration from the South to the
North has diminished since the 1990s.
The first issue with traditional transition models is that they misrepresent
global mobility equality. Demographic transition models assume that countries
would have ‘progressed to full development' once they possess traits exhibited by
affluent nations—variable fertility, stable mortality, low emigration, and high
immigration. In contrast to classic demographic models that transition from
emigration- to immigration-predominant, migration transitions based on economic
equilibrium theory expect low emigration and low immigration in both the North
and South. The expectation of an ideal configuration generates spuriousness in
terms of mobility equality for migrants coming from countries with disadvantaged
migrational positions (i.e., migration is restricted by a receiving country, or withincountry disadvantages deny mobility freedoms). We can conceptualize mobility
inequality as the disparate freedom of cross-border movement, noting that mobility
inequality is complex and multifaceted, encompassing structure and agency. For
brevity in this example we will consider mobility inequalities based on the right to
move granted by state policy via national origin.
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There are two sides to this debate. First, models suggest that at a future time
all countries worldwide would reach relative economic and human development
equality, resulting in low emigration due to the lack of incentive to migrate to a
superior location and high immigration because of attractive national political
economies. If relative wellbeing via development implies emigration reduction,
from where are immigrants coming? Zelinsky (1971, 231) and Appleyard (1992,
21) concluded that immigration acceleration would be represented by circular
movement among relatively equal states, thus redistributing the global population.
Second, classic models can also be interpreted as applicable by development level
where immigration is likely to occur between similar countries, i.e., North-North
or South-South migration, but not South-North migration. This approach imposes
a rigid modernization regime that invalidates processes of development outside
distinct expectations and measurements, thereby reinforcing development
disparities, subjugating non-conformant countries, and sustaining existing mobility
inequalities for migrants originating from less-privileged nations.
In addition, classic transition theories inadequately account for the role
immigration policy and the state play in shaping international migration patterns.
Using an example, we could conduct a counterfactual thought experiment, asking:
would migration trends continue if all political and economic ties were removed,
assuming no ecological or human-made crises? The answer is, likely not. At the
national level, international migration systems theory asserts that migration systems
are constructed via political, economic, social, and demographic contexts,
incorporate feedback and adjustments, and other historical, cultural, colonial, and
technological linkages, resulting in a general core group of receiving and sending
countries (Kritz & Zlotnik 1992). At the individual-level, migration aspirations and
capabilities theory asserts that within constraints of immigration policy,
international migration will continue indefinitely due to the perpetual demand for
family reunification and skilled and unskilled labor (Carling 2002; De Haas 2007).
We may thus expect family reunification, return, and circular migration to continue;
cultural interest or business necessity may draw a person and their network to a
particular country; environmental crises or war and political repression may
generate migration flows. Even in the absence of political-economic relations,
transnational networks maintain cross-national ties.
What then is the role of international immigration policy in influencing
migration transitions? On the one hand, scholars argue economic openness
undermines state control of immigration and naturalization policies (Sassen 1996;
Hollifield 1998; FitzGerald, Cook-Martín, García, & Arar 2017). On the other
hand, the state's capacity to control immigration has increased, and liberal states
accept more immigrants because of domestic pressures rather than external ones
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(Freeman 1998; Joppke 1998). Yet, no matter the stance, immigration policy is
designed to keep the ‘wrong type’ of immigrants out (Castles, De Haas, & Miller
2014). In the Global North immigration policies were originally created as
protectionist political mechanisms against foreigners, but have morphed into
socioeconomic mechanisms—used either as a means of inclusion to encourage
economic growth by increasing the number of foreign workers to fill labor market
demands or as a means of exclusion to protect the population from unemployment
in an economic downturn by barring immigration. Despite dialogue that
international migration is leading to the disintegration of state boundaries and
political control, nations remain involved in decisions regarding state sovereignty,
immigration policy, and border control. National immigration policy continues to
shape international migration trends.
Lastly, traditional transition theories are flawed because there is little
evidence that emigration from the South to the North has diminished since the
1990s. We recall Zelinsky speculated that with modernity, the world would reach
'mobility saturation,’ a Malthusian-esque concept akin to population carrying
capacity theorem, which predicts that the world can sustain international migration
only to a certain degree. Similarly, Martin and Taylor predicted a ‘migration
trough’ when economic development substituted migration. These are erroneous on
two counts. First, Appleyard (1992, 18) reminds us that net migration only affects
population redistribution and not global population growth. Second, if the concepts
of ‘mobility saturation’ and ‘mobility trough’ were legitimate, the world would
have already achieved ‘saturation’ with no indication of reduced migration. These
notions falsely assume that people migrate primarily for economic betterment,
ruling out structural or individual drivers. Skeldon (1997) and De Haas (2007)
argue that international mobility will continue because migration and development
are interdependent integral parts of society.
Since the implementation of development policies in the 1960s and 70s, and
again in the 1990s, United Nations’ data show that since 1960, international
migration remains at about 3% of the world’s population (UN 2002). It is forecast
to remain stable through 2050 (UNDESA 2013a). As of 2013, of the 136 million
migrants who lived in the North (Europe, North America, or Oceania), 54 million
(40%) came from other countries in the North, and 82 million (60%) came from the
South (Africa, Asia, and Latin America/ Caribbean). Likewise, of the 96 million
migrants residing in developing nations, 14 million (14%) came from the North,
and 82 million (86%) originated from the South (UNDESA 2013b). Although more
migrants live in the North, there are about the same number of migrants from the
South in developing and developed countries (North: 81.8 million, South: 82.3
million).
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At the global level, although more migrants live in the North, international
migration principally originates from the South. Of the migrants who come from
the South, they tend to move regionally, meaning much of international migration
from the South remains in the South. Most regional international migration occurs
within five migration corridors: Asia to Asia, Europe to Europe, Latin
America/Caribbean to North America, Africa to Africa, and Asia to Europe
(UNDESA 2013b; Abel & Sander 2014). Bi-national migration corridors with the
largest number of international migrants per year are from Mexico to the United
States (South-North path), Sudan to South Sudan, Palestine to Jordan, Myanmar to
Thailand (South-South paths), and India to the UAE (South-North path) (UNDESA
2013b). Among North-North and South-North pathways, the US is the most
popular destination. Among South-South and North-South pathways, Russia is both
the leading destination and origin of migration (Anich, Brian, & Laczko 2013).
Across the spectrum of countries and their development levels, a transition
from emigration- to immigration-predominant can be observed. From here, two
questions must be addressed: has increased cross-national economic development
over time led countries to transition from less to more developed? If countries
experienced economic transition, have individual countries experienced migration
transition? Mahutga and Smith (2011) examine economic growth from 1965 to
2000 and find Spain, China, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea transitioned to
higher positions in the international division of labor. They conclude that countries
of intermediate economic development levels experienced the most growth, and
state-sponsored development explains long-term economic upward mobility, not
reliance on foreign assistance. However, not all countries that experienced
economic advancement transitioned to sending countries. De Haas (2010) notes
Spain, Italy, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea transitioned from net emigration
into net immigration countries. In the case of Italy and Spain, Cook-Martín (2008)
demonstrates how structural changes brought about through economic and political
development policies appear to have reversed the flow of migrants from Spain and
Italy to Argentina.

A Way Forward: Next Steps
As to whether migration transition theory should be wholly abandoned or
revisited, we should indeed abandon counterproductive rhetoric, intentions, and
policy based on prior models that subordinate countries in and people from the
Global South. However, migration transition theory can be revisited to better
contextualize the development-migration relationship. Moving forward, we can
recognize that a transition threshold exists and explore what and how changes
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effectuate. For example, when applied to a development-migration continuum, we
may observe how nations catalyze their own transition—with or without the added
assistance of the international community. I suggest we advance future inquires in
four different ways: (1) consider an S-curve theoretical framework for long-term
international migration trends; (2) engage national, regional, and cross-national
case studies; (3) employ advanced methods and comprehensive data; and (4)
become involved in policymaking.
Firstly, in comparison to classic demographic and economic transition
models that theorized societal transformation (not transition) as stylized through an
inverted U-curve, an S-shaped growth model as a heuristic device is more suitable
because it shows that as development increases migration stabilizes. A sigmoid Scurve conceptual model follows the equation S = 𝑥/√(1 + 𝑥 2 ). Net migration
would initially be modest at lower levels of development. As development
increases, both emigration and immigration would increase (although one may be
predominant over the other). At a threshold point, net migration would flatten.
Along the standard sigmoidal curve, net migration would continue horizontally
with higher development. Yet, it is possible countries may advance or regress along
the curve, or that unforeseen factors may lead to a gradual increase or decrease in
net migration after the initial stage of stabilization (Figure 2.1). The S-shape also
smooths short-term fluctuations, absorbs gradual inclines or declines in net
migration over time, and the curve would not drop sharply due to higher
development. This model advances De Haas’ cross-sectional transition model
because it allows flexibility along a long-term continuum of migrationdevelopment characteristics. It incorporates mobility inequality across countries,
national and international systems’ immigration policy influences, and long-term
international migrational patterns. The model corresponds with dynamic, reversible
migration trends. Countries at higher levels of development would have stable net
migration (e.g., low emigration, stable immigration), and developing countries
would not experience a reversal of emigration at a certain development inflection
point, rather emigration and immigration would stabilize over time.
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Figure 2. S-Curve Growth Model

Net Migration

Figure 2.1. Classic Sigmoid S-Shaped Growth Curve

Development

The S-curve model is further supported by theoretical and empirical
findings. In his study, De Haas finds curvilinear relationships between GDP per
capita and HDI to net migration, however, in his composite model of GDP and HDI
associations to total migration, the trends are S-shaped. Also, Martin and Taylor
(1996) predicted that if migration and development were complements instead of
substitutes, migration would plateau. From 1990 to 2000, migration stabilized in
both the Global North and Global South, and it is estimated that after a slight peak
experienced in the North from 2000 to 2010, worldwide migration will continue to
stabilize through 2050 (UNDESA 2013a, 2013b).
Next, applying the S-curve heuristic, we may pursue national or regional
case studies to examine countries over time and possible predictive characteristics.
There are three possible routes: already transitioned countries; countries that did
not experience a transition; and potential transitional countries. Cook-Martín
(2008) examined specific national case studies of migration transition for Italy and
Spain, and Mahutga and Smith (2011) explored reasons that may explain structural
economic mobility for countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea, but further
research could be done on Ireland, Malaysia, and other ‘Asian Miracle’ countries
that experienced profound change. Studying transitioned countries could elucidate
what factors are consequential, as well as examining countries in which transition
did not occur. For instance, twenty-five years ago, Martin (1992, 1001) described
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how Poland was of prime interest to migration scholars because it seemed to
experience an emigration transition in the 1980s to an immigration country in the
1990s. Poland has been a country of emigration since the 1960s and remains one of
the top five sending countries (Anich, Brian, & Laczko 2013); what explains nontransitions? In the same vein, it is also worthwhile to evaluate other post-Soviet
countries in the region and other potential transition countries. Russia is the leading
sending and receiving country for South-South corridors, and a top destination for
North-South migration (Anich, Brian, & Laczko 2013). Russia may be an
appropriate contemporary case study to examine a unique political and economic
climate that could lead to stabilized internal, intra-regional, and international
migration.
For other countries that may experience migration transitions in conjunction
with higher development, we could follow Skeldon’s (1997, 15) five-tier model to
focus on international migration to the 'Expanding Core,' e.g., Brazil, China, and
India, and the ‘Labour Frontier,’ Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, and Turkey,
respectively. Immigration and development policies in and toward developing
countries are important to assess since much intra-regional and international
migration originate from comparable countries and because they have economic
stability and state formation necessary for integrated cross-national mobility. In
studying these cases within a global lens we may expect international migration
may remain at ~3% of the world’s population, emigration from mid-level
developing countries could stabilize—following an S-curve, and emigration within
least developed countries will continue since they comprise the largest proportion
of current international movement (Abel and Sander 2014).
In terms of examining migration transitions through advanced methods and
comprehensive data, De Haas (2010) and Sanderson (2009) provide sound
methodological suggestions to analyze migration, development, and transitions
across countries. De Haas (2010) provides a cross-sectional method to examine
numerous countries across development levels, acknowledging that longitudinal
data would be better, but limitations in high-quality cross-national longitudinal data
are restrictive. Likewise, Sanderson (2009) provides well-justified suggestions to
use cross-national panel data and recommends employing dynamic econometric
analysis, such as OLS-dynamic models (OLSD), random-effects models (REM), or
fixed-effects models (FEM). Longitudinal, cross-national data provide an
advantage over cross-sectional data by avoiding potential unit-specific
spuriousness and by introducing the measure of time. There are limitations to public
source data availability before 1990. Where data are available, annual data points
may be irregularly reported. These problems are compounded by data availability
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for developing nations. With the advancement of data collection and availability,
longitudinal data are ideal, although pooled data could be used.
Based on research needs, both methods are applicable, however, scholars
should proceed with discretion. Econometric models are popular among scholars
whose primary interest is to examine the effect of economic development on
international migration, using variables such as income inequality, international
trade penetration, foreign direct investment, and the proliferation of banking and
transnational corporations (Firebaugh 1999; Sanderson & Kentor 2009; Sanderson
2013a, 2013b). While these studies help us understand between- and within-country
economic disparities, research that includes human or social development measures
is sparse. One exception is Sanderson’s (2010) assessment of the association and
impact of cumulative international migration flows and human development index
(HDI) indicators. However, he inadequately explains confounding effects on
female labor force participation and female school enrollment due to insufficient
inclusion of social and human development measures, especially those pertaining
to the Global South, in the statistical models. As reference, Easterlin (2000)
suggests that while people in developing regions may overtly express their need for
economic amelioration, part of social development must include factors of
wellbeing and political participation in addition to adequate, decent work. Utilizing
sophisticated analysis models fitted to panel data that include economic and human
social development measures may provide a more complete illustration of the
relationship between international migration and development.
The last suggestion—getting involved in policymaking—is not
straightforward and eludes social scientists’ grasp to effectively enter a perennial
conversation with policymakers to affect real positive changes. Among
international migration scholars, policy-making engagement is a common
discussion topic at national and international conferences. Yet, there seems no
certain path on how to gain entrée and maintain presence. A reoccurring proposition
is to have long-term research inform far-sighted immigration policy that would
move past short-term reactionary election cycle politics and policymaking in efforts
to benefit immigrants and a receiving economy. One avenue is for interdisciplinary
scholars to join forces with international organizations to share information, collect
empirical data, and build theory. For instance, to balance mutual interests,
migration experts could advise policymakers on contemporary global migration
trends as a way to create mobility corridors based on equal mobility opportunities.
Moving forward, there is room to improve the capacity to be heard and involved in
international migration and development issues.
In conclusion, migration transition frameworks can inform appropriate
long-term policy that reflects international migration and development trends. With
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international migration estimates remaining stable through 2050, sustainable
immigration policy should be far-sighted and mutually beneficial to the interests of
sending and receiving nations, international organizations, and individual migrants.
Policies should establish ethical protocol and vetting procedures, and aim to create
safer passage for migrants, reduce clandestine and irregular migration, and
recognize the human worth of migrants by providing them with programs and tools
they may need to promote their wellbeing and success. This is salient given serious
limitations in policy that adequately address political refugees and account for
ecological refugees. For example, with increasing climate change, sustainable
immigration policies in both the Global North and South should include
mechanisms, programs, and personnel with which to respond to long-term en masse
migration shifts. With immigration policy in place like this, instead of reacting
extemporaneously, leaders may readily accommodate all types of migrants to
reduce trauma. As social scientists, we can evaluate current regional and
international migration trends against policy goals, and with more presence in the
on-going dialogue, we can better inform sustainable international immigration
policy for both the Global North and South.
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